[1939-1945] The European Idea during the Second World War: The Allies and Europe

"Neither West nor East want to save Europe: Russia wants to conquer it; America wants to buy it." Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi.  


In a 1944 book, entitled Conditions of Peace, the English diplomat Edward Hallett Carr explained that it was finally time to consider Europe "as a unit" and no longer as a collection of Nations-States. According to him, it was henceforth necessary to go beyond the simple return to the status quo ante bellum, and to set up organisations at the European level to enable the Reconstruction. It was not a federalist programme, inasmuch it did not reject the regime of national sovereignties, but a realistic plan first addressed to the Allies … who had none of it.

The works of the historians René Girault, Robert Frank and Jacques Thobie¹ clearly showed that europeanism played a minor role in Allies' official policy. However, from the beginning of the war, several American think tanks reflected on the issue of peace by defending the European idea. It was for example the case of the Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations, created by Leo Pasvolski in January 1940, or the Council on Foreign Relations, financed by the influential Rockefeller Foundation. Admittedly, these organisations did not go as far as to propose a European federation, but only a close cooperation between the nations of the continent.

Fearing that a Europe politically united could jeopardise the American hegemony, Washington rapidly dismissed the federalist solution. This is why Coudenhove-Kalergi, who pursued his activities in the USA from 1940, was completely ignored by the American leaders², just like John Foster Dulles, who supported the federalist position at the head of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ of America³.

In Great Britain, Winston Churchill did not hide his europeanist thoughts. He even proposed, in a speech broadcast the 21 March 1943, the creation of a Council of Europe, a Supreme Court and a European military for the post-war period. But in the context of the time, Churchill talked to deaf ears. Neither the American nor the Soviet wanted to hear talk of federalism. Their conception of international relations remained based on national sovereignties, balance of powers and spheres of influence.

Yalta Conference. From right to left: Winston Churchill,
Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Staline.

Europe after the Yalta Conference.

During the great conferences of Moscow (October 1943), Tehran (November and December 1943) and Yalta (February 1945), the Allied power redrawn the map of Europe. Each camp defended harshly its conception of the new world order and, overall, its best interest. Roosevelt intended to extend the American hegemony in Western Europe, Staline in Eastern Europe. As for Churchill, he fell into line with Roosevelt in order to contain the Soviet threat. All agreed to dismember Germany and to conserve the regime of national sovereignty. After the negotiations, Europe was still divided and marked by nationalism. For the time being, it did not appear possible to realise the European unity as it was dreamed by the federalists.

1René Girault, Robert Frank, Jacques Thobie, La loi des géants, 1941-1964. Histoire des relations internationales contemporaines, Paris, Payot, 2005.

2Coudenhove-Kalergi tried to meet the President Roosevelt at the White House, but his meeting request was systematically rejected. In the US Department of State, nobody wanted to deal with this aristocrat. He obtained all the same a lectureship at New York University in 1942 and his works were appreciated by some university lecturers and professors.

3See Veronika Heyde, "Discussions américaines concernant l'Europe de l'après-guerre (1940-1944)", Les cahiers Irice, 1/2008 nº1, p.49-62. URL: www.cairn.info/revue-les-cahiers-irice-2008-1-page-49.htm